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Collins v. State, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 88 (Nov. 22, 2017)1 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Summary 
 
The court determined that (1) the district court may constitutionally remove a criminal 
defendant from the courtroom for disrupting courtroom procedure, (2) a defendant does not have 
the right to appear at trial in shackles, (3) testimony about a detective’s investigation leading to 
the defendant’s arrest is not opinion about the defendant’s guilt, (4) the district court may decide 
not to instruct a jury on a lesser-included offense if no evidence on the record establishes an 
element of that offense, and (5) a specific cause of death is not required to find that a person’s 
death was caused by criminal agency. 
 
Background 
 
Police officers and detectives tied Collins to the robbery and death of Brandi Payton 
because the two were acquainted, Collins was found with several of Payton’s belongings, and 
Payton’s blood was found at Collins’s girlfriend’s house and in a rental car in Collins’s possession. 
Autopsy evidence could not reveal Payton’s cause of death. The only evidence of Collins’s 
potential provocation or passion was a statement introduced by Collins to a third party that Collins 
believed he should delete text messages between him and Payton because investigators might 
believe he “had something to do with” Payton’s death. 
At Collins’s trial, Collins refused to allow his shackles to be removed or change into 
civilian clothes despite repeated advice from counsel and the court that it was in his best interest 
to do so. The district court informed Collins that he had the choice to comply and remove his 
shackles or voluntarily waive his right to be present at trial. Collins refused both options and was 
removed from the courtroom after officers attempted to forcibly remove his shackles. After Collins 
had been removed from the courtroom, the court and counsel excused jurors for hardship, statutory 
ineligibility, and language barrier reasons. Collins was present for substantive voir dire and later 
parts of the trial. 
At trial, Detective Mogg testified that his investigation of Payton’s murder lead him to 
arrest Collins in response to assertions by Collins that the investigation was deficient and excluded 
other potential suspects. Mogg referenced interviews with individuals who participated in the trial 
as witnesses. All facts referenced in Mogg’s testimony were in evidence at the time of his 
testimony or were later introduced as evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1  By Casey Lee. 
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Discussion 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be present at every stage of a trial2, but 
may lose such right and be removed from the courtroom if, after being properly warned of the 
consequences, he or she disrupts the courtroom proceedings.3 In order to remove a criminal 
defendant for disruption, the district court must 1) advise the defendant of proper courtroom 
decorum, 2) warn the defendant that disruption will result in a waiver of the right to be present, 3) 
determine whether a lesser measure will properly remedy the defendant’s behavior, and 4) allow 
the defendant an opportunity to return if he or she promises to refrain from further disruption.4 
Further, Collins was only removed for administrative voir dire, which does not involve the 
defendant confronting witnesses against him or her and is not substantive enough to present a due 
process concern.5 
 
B. 
 
Removal decisions are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.6 Here, the district 
court decided that Collins’s refusal to allow officers to remove his shackles undermined the 
decorum of the courtroom because it created an unacceptable risk of juror prejudice.7 While a 
defendant may waive his or her right to not be tried in prison clothes8, this does not give the 
defendant the right to demand to be tried in prison clothes9 or to disrespect the court and the jury 
by defying court orders.10 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
A witness may not give a direct opinion as to whether the defendant is guilty or innocent.11 
However, this does not mean that witnesses may not give any testimony implying that they believe 
the defendant is guilty, or from which a juror could infer that belief.12 The detective’s statements 
                                                          
2  Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985); see NEV. CONST. 
art. I, § 8. 
3  Allen, 397 U.S. at 343; see NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.387(1)(c) (2017). 
4  FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES § 5.01 (6th ed. 2013) (interpreting FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 43(c)); see NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.387. 
5  See Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526; United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2002). 
6  United States v. Hellems, 866 F.3d 856, 863–64 (8th Cir. 2017); cf. Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1001–02, 
946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997). 
7  See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630–31 (2005); State v. McKay, 63 Nev. 118, 163, 165 P.2d 389, 409 (1946). 
8  Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 521 (1976). 
9  Deck, 544 U.S. at 631. 
10  See United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir. 2015); LaGon v. State, 778 S.E.2d 32, 41 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2015). 
11  See Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 669, 6 P.3d 481, 485 (2000). 
12  See Ogden v. State, 34 P.3d 271, 277 (Wyo. 2001). 
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about his investigation and the reasons he arrested Collins did not even imply that he believed 
Collins had committed the crime, merely that there was enough evidence to arrest Collins which 
requires a different standard of proof.13 Mogg’s testimony also did not improperly circumvent 
hearsay or relevance requirements for evidence because he did not testify about the contents of the 
other witnesses’ statements and his testimony was submitted to rebut Collins’s assertion that the 
investigation was inadequate. 
 
B. 
 
Criminal defendants are entitled to jury instructions on lesser-included offenses only if 
there is any evidence to reasonably support it.14 This restriction prevents juries from returning 
unsupported “compromise verdicts” for sympathetic defendants.15 Voluntary manslaughter is a 
lesser-included offense of murder16 requiring that the person killing be provoked by the person 
killed or excited into an irresistible passion.17 The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that Collins’s comments about his conversation with Payton was insufficient to show 
passion or provocation. 
 
C. 
 
A conviction is only overturned for lack of substantial evidence if any rational factfinder 
could not find the essential elements of the crime at hand beyond a reasonable doubt on the 
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecutor.18 One essential element of murder 
is that a person’s death was caused by the criminal agency of another person.19 However, the 
prosecution need not prove the specific cause of death to prove that death was the result of criminal 
agency.20 The court determined that the evidence taken together could lead a rational factfinder to 
find Payton’s death was caused by criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The district court’s removal of Collins for procedural voir dire did not infringe on his 
constitutional rights because Collins did not have a right to demand to appear in court in his 
shackles and prison clothes. Detective Mogg’s testimony about his investigation and arrest of 
Collins was properly included because it was relevant, did not violate rules against hearsay, and 
was not opinion about Collins’s guilt. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to 
instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Collins’s conviction of first degree murder was 
supported by sufficient evidence. The court affirmed Collins’s conviction in district court. 
                                                          
13  See Commonwealth v. Luciano, 944 N.E.2d 196, 202 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011). 
14  Rosas v. State, 122 Nev. 1258, 1265, 147 P.3d 1101, 1106 (2006). 
15  Id. at 1106, 147 P.3d at 1265. 
16  Williams v. State, 99 Nev. 530, 531, 665 P.2d 260, 261 (1983). 
17  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.040 to 200.060 (2017). 
18  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992). 
19  West v. State, 119 Nev. 410, 415–16, 75 P.3d 808, 812 (2003). 
20  Id. at 418, 75 P.3d at 813; accord Middleton v. State, 114 Nev. 1089, 1103, 968 P.2d 296, 306 (1998). 
